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Abstract. We empirically investigate the role of regulatory governance and industrial 
clusters to foster the country’s economic performance. Using the ordinary least-square 
(OLS) regression for a cross section of countries, including the 25 EU Member States, 
our findings show that the regulation governance has the strongest effects on the 
employment rate performing a buffering effect with the cluster development. An 
antagonist effect occurs for the other economic indicators. 
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1. Introduction 
 
According to many governments and international organizations (notably the OECD and 
the EU) the competitive strategy of small firms and the development of local areas are 
significantly affected by the presence of clusters, that can be defined by the co-location of 
producers, services providers, educational and research institutions, financial institutions 
and other private and government institutions related trough linkages of different types. 
The empirical literature has shown that clusters bring economic gains, because firms 
perform better when located near other firms in the same sector (Breznitz, 2013; Urbanoet 
al., 2013). In particular, they have been crucial in traditional industries, such as textiles in 
North Italy and financial areas in the City of London. On the basis of this view, most 
European countries are currently active in developing and implementing policies, at 
national and regional level, for cluster development (i.e. the National Reform Programmes 
and the National Strategic Reference Framework). These policies are designed to increase 
the dynamic social and organizational network, the so-called “institutional fix” or social 
glue, that holds the different interlinked innovation actors – such as universities, 
businesses and public authorities – together and facilitates intense interaction and 
cooperation amongst them. 
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According to the results of the Innobarometer 2006 survey
1
, the cluster firms emphasize 
the importance of governance quality of institutions for the cluster development. In fact, 
any policy support for clusters may fail if there is poor governance in the country. For 
example, a country with low quality of public services and regulations would not be able 
to show high level of economic development and, hence, the cluster development would 
be limited. 
 
The literature on economic regulation, developed from the nineteenth century, is now vast 
(Laffont and Tirole, 1993, 2000; Levy and Spiller, 1994; Newbery, 1999). The case for 
economic regulation is premised on the existence of significant market failure resulting 
from economies of scale and scope in production, from information imperfections in 
market transactions, from the existence of incomplete markets and externalities, and from 
income and wealth distribution effects.The literature of recent years has shown clearly that 
the institutions exert a profound influence on economic performance and other measures 
of development (North, 1990; Aron, 2000; Rodriket al., 2004). Differences in governance 
of institutions play an important role in explaining why the levels of economic 
development differ in great degrees between countries.  An economy with a developed 
institutional capacity is more likely to be able to design and implement effective 
regulation. While the relationship between governance and economic development has 
been well established in many studies (i.e. Khan, 2007; Habtamu, 2008); the relationship 
between governance and the performance of the firms has attracted very little attention. 
Furthermore, the role of governance in the country’s economic performance related to 
cluster development is not clearly understood.The present paper attempts to fill this gap. In 
more details, the present study is based on two assumptions. Firstly, clusters bring 
economic gains in the geographic area where they are located, for example, in terms of 
higher labour productivity, income and employment. Secondly, cluster development 
occurs in those countries with high perceived regulatory quality of institutions. We 
empirically investigate the role of clusters development jointly with regulatory governance 
to foster the country’s economic performance.  
 
2. Empirical Specification and Data 
 
In order to investigate the role of regulatory governance on the economic impacts of 
cluster economic, the ordinary least-square (OLS) regression is carried out for a cross 
section of countries. In more details, the empirical specification is constructed as follows. 
Let Y denote a measure of economic performance, we first regress Y upon the size of a 
cluster S (measured as employment of a given sector in a given country) and the matrix of 
control variables X: 
                                                          
1
 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_187_en.pdf 
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 𝑌 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆 + 𝛾𝑋 + 𝜖      (1) 
 
where 𝜖 is the stochastic error term. The matrix X includes a set of control variables 
previously identified as the main driving forces of the economic indicators in the empirical 
literature. In our analysis we include in the matrix X the following three variables: 
population rate, R&D share of GDP and average years of schooling. Second, in order to 
investigate the impacts of regulation on the economic performance measures (Y), we 
regress Y upon the regulatory index Zand the matrix of control variables (X): 
 
 𝑌 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑍 + 𝑔𝑋 + 𝜀      (2) 
 
where 𝜀 is the stochastic error term. Then, in order to investigate therole of regulation 
related to the size of a cluster, we regress the economic performance, Y, upon the size of a 
cluster (S),the regulatory index (Z),  the matrix of control variables (X) and an interaction 
term between S and Z as follows: 
 
 𝑌 = 𝛿 + 𝜃𝑆 + 𝜌𝑍 + 𝜎𝑆𝑍 + 𝜗𝑋 + 𝜇    (3) 
 
where 𝜇 is the stochastic error term. If the regression coefficient of the interaction term is 
significant, it suggests that the regulatory indicator has a moderator role in the relationship 
between the economic performance and the size of cluster. The moderation effect can be 
(1) enhancing if the coefficients upon the size of cluster, the regulation indicators and the 
interaction term have the same sign; (2) buffering if the coefficients upon the size of 
cluster and the regulation indicators have opposite sign and the coefficient upon the 
interaction term have the same sign of that of the regulation indicator; (3) antagonist  if the 
coefficients upon the size of cluster and the regulation indicators have the same size and 
the interaction term have the opposite sign. Data on the size of a cluster and economic 
performance come from the European Cluster Observatory (ECO), which provides for the 
first time a cluster mapping based on regional employment data, that are collected mainly 
from EUROSTAT and national or regional statistical sources. 
 
We use two variables that come closest to capture the quality of the outcome and process 
dimensions of regulation, namely, the regulatory quality and government effectiveness 
indices. The regulatory quality index measures the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. This index is taken as a proxy for the quality of the outcomes of applying 
regulatory instruments. The government effectiveness index measures the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. This index is taken as a proxy for the process 
dimensions (consistency, accountability, transparency) of regulatory governance.Data on 
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regulatory indicators come from Kaufmann et al. (2010). Since 2002 the WGI dimensions 
are published annually by the World Bank and the estimates actually cover the period 
1996-2010.The estimate of these governance indicators ranges from approximately -2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong) performance.  
 
We use three measures of economic performance: labour productivity, disposable income 
per capita and employment rate. The sample consists of 100 observations, the period of 
investigation includes six years, ranging from 2005 to 2010, and the sample includes 25 
EU Member States. The lack of a larger sample size is caused by a lack of consistent and 
available data for the EU Member States not included in the sample for the period of 
investigation. In Appendix, Tables A1 and A2 report more details concerning, 
respectively, the list of countries per year and summary statistics.   
 
3. Results 
 
The correlation coefficients between size of a cluster, regulatory indices and economic 
performance can be found in Table 1. The correlation coefficients have the expected 
positive signs, except between government effectiveness and size of a cluster, that have a 
negative correlation rate. The correlation rate between regulatory indices and size of 
cluster is strongly low. The regulatory indicators are highly correlated; thus, they are 
included separately in the regression analysis. The correlation rate of the regulatory 
indices with labour productivity and employment rate is high, but we consider it as 
acceptable for the regression analysis. 
 
Table 2 shows the regression results of the cluster size and regulatory indices on labour 
productivity. For the control variables, we mainly find low and negative marginal effects 
for population rate and average years of schooling on labour productivity. Their 
coefficients are not statistically significant. Positive marginal effects occur for R&D on 
labour productivity with the coefficient statistically significant. Also the coefficients upon 
the size of cluster and regulatory indicators are positive and statistically significant. 
Comparing regression (1.1) with regression (1.2) and (1.4), we note that the marginal 
effect of regulatory indicators are higher than that of the size of cluster. Furthermore, 
comparing regression (1.1) with regression (1.3) and (1.5), where we introduce the 
regulatory indicators, we have that the marginal effect of the size of cluster increases by 
0.60 (on average). This finding supports the fact that economic performance may increase 
the positive role of cluster if regulatory quality occurs. However, the negative sign of the 
coefficient upon the interaction term suggests an antagonistic effect between regulation 
and the size of cluster. In fact, from regressions (1.3) and (1.5), we have that the effect of 
cluster size is reduced by 0.04 (on average) as one of the regulatory indicators increase by 
one unit.     
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Table 1: Correlation Coefficients 
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Size (%) 1 
        Government Effectiveness -0.019 1 
       Regulatory Quality 0.036 0.909 1 
      Labour productivity 
(thousand EUR PPP) 0.334 0.769 0.719 1 
     Disposable income per 
capita (EUR PPP) 0.496 0.680 0.620 0.914 1 
    Employment rate (%) -0.084 0.776 0.720 0.508 0.499 1 
   Populationages 15-64 (% of 
total) -0.351 -0.565 -0.543 -0.636 -0.639 -0.455 1 
  Business R&D share of 
GDP (%) 0.106 0.884 0.784 0.735 0.686 0.719 -0.616 1 
 
Averageyears of schooling -0.045 0.053 0.085 -0.059 -0.172 -0.020 0.333 0.050 1 
 
Table 2: Regression Results (Dependent Variable: Natural Log of Labour Productivity) 
 
  (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) 
Constant 11.797*** 12.279*** 9.828*** 12.807*** 10.021*** 
Populationages 15-64 (% of total) -0.020 -0.031* -0.001 -0.037** -0.003 
Business R&D share of GDP (%) 0.291*** 0.147*** 0.154*** 0.030 -0.094* 
Average years of schooling -0.008 -0.010 -0.005 -0.003 0.010 
Cluster Size 0.015*** 
 
0.077*** 
 
0.073*** 
RegulatoryQuality 
 
0.383*** 0.592*** 
  Cluster Size * Regulatory Quality 
  
-0.044*** 
  Government Effectiveness 
   
0.335*** 0.666*** 
Cluster Size * GovernmentEffectiveness 
    
-0.038*** 
Obs. 100 100 100 100 100 
R2 0.601 0.618 0.703 0.643 0.804 
Adj R2 0.585 0.602 0.684 0.628 0.791 
F-Test 35.843 38.479 36.744 42.756 63.501 
 
Note:  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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The results on income per capita, reported in Table 3, are qualitatively similar to those 
reported for labour productivity; but we find strongest marginal effects by government 
effectiveness. Again we have an antagonistic effect between regulation indicators and the 
size of cluster. 
 
Table 3: Regression Results (Dependent Variable: Natural Log of Income per capita) 
 
  (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) 
Constant 9.945*** 11.762*** 8.338*** 12.197*** 8.077*** 
Population ages 15-64 (% of total) -0.008 -0.038* 0.010 -0.043** 0.012 
Business R&D share of GDP (%) 0.339*** 0.185*** 0.201*** 0.056 -0.061 
Averageyears of schooling -0.051** -0.045* -0.061** -0.039* -0.044** 
Cluster Size 0.028*** 
 
0.045* 
 
0.070*** 
RegulatoryQuality 
 
0.348*** 0.485*** 
  Cluster Size * Regulatory Quality 
  
-0.010 
  Government Effectiveness 
   
0.337*** 0.653*** 
Cluster Size * Government Effectiveness 
    
-0.025*** 
Obs. 100 100 100 100 100 
R2 0.624 0.561 0.680 0.586 0.769 
Adj R2 0.608 0.543 0.659 0.569 0.754 
F-Test 39.400 30.353 32.889 33.682 51.459 
 
Note:  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Finally, table 4 shows the regression results of the cluster size and regulatory indices on 
the employment rate. Differently to the previous economic indicators, we have here a 
negative sign for the coefficient upon the size of cluster. However, this negative marginal 
effect is compensated by the buffering effect of the regulatory indicators. In fact, we have 
that the effect of cluster size is reduced by 0.9 and 0.25 as, respectively, regulatory quality 
and government effectiveness increases by one unit. The regulatory quality has a marginal 
effect higher than the marginal effect of government effectiveness on the employment rate. 
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Table 4: Regression Results (Dependent Variable: Employment Rate) 
 
  (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) 
Constant 79.886
***
 41.423
**
 69.633
***
 51.168
***
 65.257
***
 
Populationages 15-64 (% of total) -0.253 0.254 -0.039 0.145 -0.012 
Business R&D share of GDP (%) 5.054
***
 3.234
***
 3.202
***
 1.326 2.076
*
 
Averageyears of schooling -0.150 -0.458 -0.707
**
 -0.340 -0.454 
Cluster Size -0.213
**
 
 
-1.390
***
 
 
-0.437
**
 
RegulatoryQuality 
 
6.826
***
 3.164
*
 
  Cluster Size * Regulatory Quality 
  
0.912
***
 
  Government Effectiveness 
   
5.731
***
 3.741
**
 
Cluster Size * Government Effectiveness 
    
0.250
*
 
Obs. 100 100 100 100 100 
R2 0.551 0.589 0.655 0.612 0.632 
Adj R2 0.532 0.572 0.633 0.595 0.608 
F-Test 29.111 34.104 29.447 37.418 26.602 
 
Note:  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Clusters bring economic gains in the area where they are located. The provision of a 
regulatory regime that promotes cluster development is important for the economic 
performance of a country. Also the impact of regulatory institutions on economic 
performance depends on both the efficiency of the regulatory policies and instruments that 
are used, and the quality of the governance processes, that are applied by the regulatory 
authorities. Thus, the aim of this paper has been to analyze the effects of regulation 
support jointly to cluster development on the economic performance. The results are 
consistent for combination of regulatory measures and economic performance variables. 
Our findings suggest that the ability of the government to provide effective regulatory 
institutions jointly to cluster development can be expected to be a determinant of how well 
the economy performs. However, our findings suggest that the regulatory support must be 
differentiated taking into account that regulatory indicators have an antagonist effect with 
the size of cluster on labour productivity and income per capita; whereas, they have a 
buffering effect with the size of cluster on the employment rate.  
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Table A1: List of countries per year 
 
Code Region Year Code Region Year Code Region Year 
AT Austria 2005 FR France 2007 NL Netherlands 2005 
AT Austria 2006 FR France 2008 NL Netherlands 2007 
AT Austria 2007 FR France 2009 PL Poland 2007 
AT Austria 2008 FR France 2010 PL Poland 2008 
AT Austria 2009 DE Germany 2005 PL Poland 2009 
AT Austria 2010 DE Germany 2006 PL Poland 2010 
BE Belgium 2005 DE Germany 2007 PT Portugal 2005 
BE Belgium 2006 DE Germany 2008 PT Portugal 2006 
BE Belgium 2007 DE Germany 2009 PT Portugal 2007 
BE Belgium 2008 DE Germany 2010 PT Portugal 2008 
BG Bulgaria 2005 GR Greece 2006 PT Portugal 2009 
BG Bulgaria 2006 HU Hungary 2005 RO Romania 2005 
BG Bulgaria 2007 HU Hungary 2006 RO Romania 2010 
BG Bulgaria 2008 HU Hungary 2007 SK Slovakia 2005 
BG Bulgaria 2009 HU Hungary 2008 SK Slovakia 2006 
BG Bulgaria 2010 HU Hungary 2009 SK Slovakia 2007 
CZ Czech Republic 2005 HU Hungary 2010 SK Slovakia 2008 
CZ Czech Republic 2006 IE Ireland 2008 SK Slovakia 2009 
DK Denmark 2005 IT Italy 2005 SI Slovenia 2005 
DK Denmark 2006 IT Italy 2006 SI Slovenia 2006 
DK Denmark 2007 IT Italy 2007 SI Slovenia 2007 
DK Denmark 2008 IT Italy 2008 SI Slovenia 2008 
DK Denmark 2009 IT Italy 2009 SI Slovenia 2009 
EE Estonia 2008 LV Latvia 2006 SI Slovenia 2010 
EE Estonia 2009 LV Latvia 2007 ES Spain 2008 
EE Estonia 2010 LV Latvia 2008 SE Sweden 2005 
FI Finland 2005 LV Latvia 2009 SE Sweden 2006 
FI Finland 2006 LV Latvia 2010 SE Sweden 2007 
FI Finland 2007 LT Lithuania 2005 SE Sweden 2008 
FI Finland 2008 LT Lithuania 2006 SE Sweden 2009 
FI Finland 2009 LT Lithuania 2007 SE Sweden 2010 
FI Finland 2010 LT Lithuania 2008 UK United Kingdom 2005 
FR France 2005 LT Lithuania 2009 
   FR France 2006 LT Lithuania 2010 
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Table A2: Summary statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. 
Size (%) 4.20 5.18 
GovernmentEffectiveness 1.17 0.66 
RegulatoryQuality 1.23 0.37 
Labour productivity (thousand EUR PPP) 47939 15341 
Disposableincome per capita (EUR PPP) 11935 4384 
Employment rate (%) 65.30 5.84 
Populationages 15-64 (% of total) 67.76 1.96 
Business R&D share of GDP (%) 1.01 0.80 
Averageyears of schooling 10.91 1.37 
   
 
